SUPREME COURT NO. 92663-8
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 46084-0-II

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DAVID E. BLISS,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SKAMANIA COUNTY

The Honorable Brian Altman, Judge

PETITION FOR REVIEW

LISA E. TABBUT
Attorney for Petitioner
P. O. Box 1319
Winthrop, WA 98862
(509) 996-3959

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Statutes

Other Authorities

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Petitioner David E. Bliss asks this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review designated in Part B of this petition.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals published opinion No. 46084-0-II. A copy of the opinion is attached as Appendix.

C. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether it was within the authority of a Skamania County district court judge to approve the interception and recording of a one-party consent telephone call when there is no specific legislative grant for a district court judge to hear a felony case?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The state charged David Bliss with four counts of Rape of a Child in the First Degree and one count of Incest in the First Degree. CP 1-4. Mr. Bliss moved to suppress all evidence attendant to a recorded phone call placed by law enforcement from the Skamania County Sheriff's Office to Mr. Bliss's hardline phone in Clark County, Washington. CP 5-28. During the call, Mr. Bliss spoke to his sister and alleged victim, C.B. Mr. Bliss was not on notice that law enforcement was listening to or recording the call.

Skamania County District Court Judge Ronald Reynier authorized the recording of the call pursuant to RCW 9.73.090(2). In the authorization request, Skamania County Sergeant Buettner told the court there was probable cause to believe Mr. Bliss committed the crime of Rape of a Child in the First Degree and C.B. consented to the recording of the call. CP 26-27.

Superior Court Judge Brian Altman granted Mr. Bliss's motion and suppressed the recorded call and "all of its attendant details." RP 2/13/14 at 1-39; RP 2/27/14 at 2-11. Judge Altman ruled Judge Reynier, acting in his capacity as a district court judge, had no authority to grant an intercept order and the one-party consent recording of a private phone call placed to and received in a county outside of the court's limited jurisdiction. RP 2/27/14 at 4-11. The court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. CP 85-87.

The State moved for reconsideration. CP 69-78. Judge Altman denied the request. RP 4/17/14 at 2-25. With the matter pending for trial, the Court of Appeals granted the state's request for discretionary review and later, by its published opinion, reversed Judge Altman. Mr. Bliss takes exception to the reversal and asks this court to accept review of the Court of Appeals opinion.

E. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

District Court Judge Reynier had no authority to issue an intercept order for a felony offense.

Pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(3) and (4), a petition for review will be accepted by the Supreme Court if it presents a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or if it involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the Supreme Court.

Under Washington Constitution, Article 4, Sections 1, 10, and 12, the legislature has the sole authority to create inferior courts in this state and to determine the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of those inferior courts that the legislature creates. *Young v. Konz*, 91 Wn.2d 532, 541, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979). These three constitutional provisions provide:

> The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.
>
> The legislature shall ... prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of the justices of the peace....
>
> The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance to this Constitution.

Washington Constitution, Article 4, Section 1, 10 (in part), and 12.

On an initial review, RCW 9.73.030(2) seems to provide broad authority for a district court judge to issue an intercept order.

> (2) It shall not be unlawful for a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's official duties to intercept, record, or disclose an oral communication or conversation where the officer is a party to the communication or conversation or one of the parties to the communication or conversation has given prior consent to the interception, recording, or disclosure: PROVIDED, *That prior to the interception, transmission, or recording the officer shall obtain written or telephonic authorization from a judge or magistrate*[1], *who shall approve the interception, recording, or disclosure of communications or conversations with a nonconsenting party for a reasonable and specified period of time, if there is probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about to commit a felony:* PROVIDED HOWEVER, That if such authorization is given by telephone the authorization and officer's statement justifying such authorization must be electronically recorded by the judge or magistrate on a recording device in the custody of the judge or magistrate at the time transmitted and the recording shall be retained in the court records and reduced to writing as soon as possible thereafter.

(Emphasis in italics) However, RCW 3.66.100(1) limits a district court judge's ability to authorize criminal process.

> Every district judge having authority to *hear* a particular case may issue criminal process in and to any place in the state.

The legislature has given district court judges no specific authority to "hear" the felonies at issue in RCW 9.73.030(2). In its opinion, the Court of Appeals points to several circumstances over which the legislature has conferred jurisdiction to district courts. Court of Appeals

---

[1] A magistrate is a district court judge. RCW 2.20.020

Opinion at 9. For example, RCW 3.66.010(1) provides that district court can hear "preliminary hearings in cases provided by law." Similarly, under RCW 3.66.060,

> The district court shall have jurisdiction: (1) Concurrent with the superior court of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed in their respective counties and of all violations of city ordinances. It shall in no event impose a greater punishment than a fine of five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for one year in the county or city jail as the case may be, or both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. It may suspend and revoke vehicle operators' licenses in the cases provided by law; (2) to sit as a committing magistrate and conduct preliminary hearings in cases provided by law; (3) concurrent with the superior court of a proceeding to keep the peace in their respective counties; (4) concurrent with the superior court of all violations under Title 77 RCW; (5) to hear and determine traffic infractions under chapter 46.63 RCW; and (6) to take recognizance, approve bail, and arraign defendants held within its jurisdiction on warrants issued by other courts of limited jurisdiction when those courts are participating in the program established under RCW 2.56.160.

Yet nowhere does the legislature grant district court judges broad authority to actually hear felony cases from beginning to end. That limitation left Skamania County District Court Judge Reynier with no authority to issue an intercept order because he cannot hear a felony case. A court lacks jurisdiction when it does not have a specific grant of authority to act. *Sloans v. Barry*, 189 Wn. App. 368, 372, 358 P.3d 426 (2015).

The trial court properly suppressed the intercepted call and all attendant circumstances. *State v. Fjermedstad*, 114 Wn. 828, 791 P.2d 897 (1990). This court should accept review and affirm Judge Altman's ruling.

F. CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and thereby affirm the trial court's suppression of Mr. Bliss's statements obtained during the illegally intercepted phone conversation.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of February 2016.



LISA E. TABBUT/WSBA #21344
Attorney for David E. Bliss

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Lisa E. Tabbut declares as follows:

On today's date, I efiled this Petition for Review with (1) the Washington State Supreme Court via the Court of Appeals Division Two efile, (2) Adam Kick, Skamania County Prosecutor's Office, at kick@co.skamania.wa.us; and by mail to (3) David E. Bliss, 14913 SE Mill Plain Blvd E-30, Vancouver, WA 98684.

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Signed February 16, 2016, in Winthrop, Washington.



Lisa E. Tabbut, WSBA No. 21344
Attorney for David E. Bliss

APPENDIX

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two

December 22, 2015

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. DAVID E. BLISS, Respondent.	No. 46084-0-II PUBLISHED OPINION

JOHANSON, C.J. — The State appeals from a superior court order granting David Bliss's motion to suppress a telephonic recording during which Bliss made incriminating statements. The superior court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to authorize the interception and recording of the telephone call. The State argues that the plain language of Washington's "Privacy Act," specifically RCW 9.73.090(2), gives district courts the authority to grant telephone interception and recording authorizations and that authority is within its jurisdiction.

We hold that by enacting RCW 9.73.090(2), the legislature granted district courts the authority to issue telephonic interception and recording authorizations under the Privacy Act and that this specific grant of authority falls within a district court's jurisdiction over preliminary criminal matters. We reverse the superior court's suppression order and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

In July 2013, C.[1] reported to Sergeant Monty Buettner of the Skamania County Sheriff's Office that Bliss repeatedly sexually abused her when she was between the ages of seven and eleven. C. reported this information after allegations arose that Bliss had sexually abused his girlfriend's three-year-old child.

On July 30, Sergeant Buettner applied to the Skamania County District Court for authorization under RCW 9.73.090(2) to intercept and record a telephone conversation between C. and Bliss. The call's purpose was to obtain evidence that Bliss had committed first degree rape of a child and/or incest. C. consented to the Skamania County Sheriff's Office recording and monitoring the conversation.

The district court judge granted Sergeant Buettner's application to intercept and record C.'s conversations with Bliss between July 30, 2013 and August 6, 2013. The district court judge found probable cause to believe that Bliss had committed the alleged crimes and that evidence relating to the crimes would be obtained by intercepting and recording the telephone conversation. He also found that intercepting and recording the conversations would substantially aid and supplement normal investigative techniques.

[1] *See* Division Two General Order 2011-1 ("in all opinions, orders and rulings in sex crime cases, this Court shall use initials or pseudonyms in place of the names of all witnesses known to have been under the age of 18 at the time of any event in the case").

Within the approved timeframe, C. placed a call to Bliss from the sheriff's office in Skamania County.[2] During the recorded call, Bliss admitted to sexually abusing C. when C. was a small child. At Buettner's direction, police arrested Bliss and the State charged him with four counts of first degree child rape and one count of first degree incest.

Before trial, Bliss moved to suppress the recording and all references to the telephone conversation. He argued that suppression was required because the district court judge had neither the jurisdiction nor the authority to issue the interception and recording authorization. The Skamania County Superior Court granted Bliss's motion, ruling that district courts lack authority to grant authorizations under RCW 9.73.090(2), the controlling provision of the Privacy Act. We granted discretionary review of this ruling under RAP 2.3(b)(2).

ANALYSIS

The State contends that the superior court erred in granting Bliss's motion, arguing that district courts have authority to grant telephonic interception and recording authorizations under RCW 9.73.090(2) because the statute's plain language refers to "a judge or magistrate," which includes district court judges under RCW 2.20.020(3) and because other provisions within the Privacy Act contemplate that district court judges will issue recording authorizations. The State contends that the district court's telephonic interception and recording authorizations are valid even though the call here was placed to someone outside the county and the underlying crime was a felony. We agree.

[2] Bliss was in Clark County during the call. The Privacy Act applies to recorded communications "between two or more individuals between points within or without the state." RCW 9.73.030(1)(a).

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

We review conclusions of law in a suppression of evidence order de novo. *State v. Arreola*, 176 Wn.2d 284, 291, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. *State v. Conover*, 183 Wn.2d 706, 711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015). Similarly, whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. *State v. Peltier*, 181 Wn.2d 290, 294, 332 P.3d 457 (2014).

Washington's courts of limited jurisdiction are created by the legislature. WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 12. The legislature has sole authority to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers. *Young v. Konz*, 91 Wn.2d 532, 540, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979). The subject matter jurisdiction of district courts is therefore limited to that affirmatively granted by statute. "'Jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine.'" *State v. Werner*, 129 Wn.2d 485, 493, 918 P.2d 916 (1996) (quoting *State ex rel. McGlothern v. Superior Court*, 112 Wash. 501, 505, 192 P. 937 (1920)). "A tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction when it attempts to decide a type of controversy over which it has no authority to adjudicate." *Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994).

B. DISTRICT COURT'S PRIVACY ACT AUTHORITY

Our primary objective when reviewing questions of statutory interpretation is to determine and to apply the legislature's intent. *State v. Donaghe*, 172 Wn.2d 253, 261-62, 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting *State v. Jacobs*, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). We determine legislative intent from the statute's plain language "'considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.'" *Conover*, 183 Wn.2d at 711 (quoting

Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wn.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015)). Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be read as complimentary. *State v. Wright*, 84 Wn.2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453 (1974).

Washington's Privacy Act is one of the most restrictive in the nation. *State v. Kipp*, 179 Wn.2d 718, 724, 317 P.3d 1029 (2014). Washington is one of only 11 states that requires all parties to a private communication consent to its recording and disclosure. *Kipp*, 179 Wn.2d at 725. Specifically, the Privacy Act prohibits recording of any

> [p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.

RCW 9.73.030(1)(a). Thus, in Washington, "the privacy act is implicated when one party records a conversation without the other party's consent." *Kipp*, 179 Wn.2d at 724.

Ordinarily, information obtained in violation of the Privacy Act is inadmissible in courts of general or limited jurisdiction. RCW 9.73.050. But the Privacy Act contains several exceptions to the general "all-party consent" rule. One such exception, set forth in RCW 9.73.090(2), is relevant here. That section provides,

> It shall not be unlawful for a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's official duties to intercept, record, or disclose an oral communication or conversation where the officer is a party to the communication or conversation or one of the parties to the communication or conversation has given prior consent to the interception, recording, or disclosure: PROVIDED, That prior to the interception, transmission, or recording the officer shall obtain written or telephonic *authorization from a judge or magistrate*, who shall approve the interception, recording, or disclosure of communications or conversations with a nonconsenting party for a reasonable and specified period of time, if there is probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about to commit a felony.

Here, RCW 9.73.090(2) governs the outcome because Sergeant Buettner recorded the phone call between C. and Bliss with C.'s consent and only after obtaining the requisite authorization from the district court judge. So long as the district court's authorization was valid, the Privacy Act was not violated.

Although RCW 9.73.090(2) does not use the term district courts or district court judges, it states that both "judges and magistrates" may authorize one-party consent recordings. Elsewhere in the revised code, district court judges are among those included in the category of magistrates.[3] RCW 2.20.020(3); *Werner*, 129 Wn.2d at 494. Neither party appears to dispute that this definition applies.

Besides the plain language of the statute, an examination of related provisions within the Privacy Act also supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to grant district court judges the authority to issue recording authorizations under RCW 9.73.090(2). For instance, RCW 9.73.040(1)(a) governs requests to intercept communications when there are reasonable grounds to believe that national security is endangered, that a human life is in danger, that arson is about to be committed, or that a riot is about to be committed. That statute specifies that only superior court judges may issue such orders. RCW 9.73.040(1).

---

[3] RCW 2.20.020 provides,

> The following persons are magistrates:
>
> (1) The justices of the supreme court.
>
> (2) The judges of the court of appeals.
>
> (3) The superior judges, and district judges.
>
> (4) All municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties of district judges.

Still another provision in the Privacy Act specifies that in counties of a particular size, at least one superior court judge, district court judge, or magistrate must be available 24 hours a day to receive telephonic requests for authorizations that may be issued under the Privacy Act. RCW 9.73.220. When we read the related provisions and the statutory scheme as a whole, it is evident that the legislature intended to provide district court judges, in certain instances, the power to authorize requests for one-party consent recordings.

Because district court judges are included in the definition of magistrates, RCW 9.73.090(2) is one such instance. And had the legislature wished to limit authorization under RCW 9.73.090(2) to only certain judges—such as superior court judges—it was aware how to do so.

C. DISTRICT COURT'S CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Although Bliss recognizes that RCW 9.73.090(2) appears to provide "broad authority" for a district court judge to issue a recording authorization, he contends this power is contrary to the law governing the criminal and territorial jurisdiction of district courts. According to Bliss, the district court's recording authorization was invalid because the district court had no authority to issue such an authorization when the telephone call was made to someone outside of Skamania County, and the underlying crime was a felony, a crime that the district court has no "authority to hear." Br. of Resp't at 7. We disagree because interceptions and recordings occur where made and because district courts are permitted to conduct preliminary hearings on matters provided by law.

RCW 3.66.060 governs the district court's criminal jurisdiction. It provides, in relevant part, that the district court shall have jurisdiction to sit as a committing magistrate and conduct preliminary hearings in cases provided by law. And regarding a district court's territorial

jurisdiction, RCW 3.66.100(1) explains that "[e]very district judge having authority to hear a particular case may issue criminal process in and to any place in the state."

First, Bliss provides no authority to support the proposition that a district court's one-party consent recording authorization is invalid when the telephone call was made to a county other than the one where both the alleged crimes occurred and the recording authorization issued. Our Supreme Court has long held that an interception occurs where it was made and that even a recorded telephone call placed to a location outside the United States is permissible if the interception and recording was legal under Washington law. *See Kadoranian by Peach v. Bellingham Police Dep't*, 119 Wn.2d 178, 186, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992).

Bliss instead cites *State v. Davidson*, 26 Wn. App. 623, 613 P.2d 564 (1980), contending that it controls the outcome of this case. But *Davidson* does not apply here. *Davidson* involved a King County District Court's authority to issue a warrant to search a Snohomish County location where there was no allegation that any crime had been committed in King County. 26 Wn. App. at 624-25. Division One of this court held that the trial court correctly determined that the evidence had to be suppressed because the boundaries of a county ordinarily define a district court's territorial jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is only expanded for issuing criminal process when the district court has the authority to hear the case. RCW 3.66.100(1); *Davidson*, 26 Wn. App. at 625.

Because no crime occurred in King County, the King County District Court there had no authority to hear the case and consequently could not issue a valid warrant. RCW 3.66.060; *Davidson*, 26 Wn. App. at 625. The court held further that neither a separate statutory provision authorizing a district court to issue warrants for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50.509, nor a court rule permitting such courts to issue criminal process to anywhere

in the state, warranted reversal of the trial court's suppression ruling. *Davidson*, 26 Wn. App. at 625-26. The court rejected that contention because such a reading of the statutes would have enlarged the district court's statutorily created jurisdiction in violation of the state constitution. *Davidson*, 26 Wn. App. at 626.

But here, Bliss does not argue that, like *Davidson*, no crime occurred in Skamania County. Bliss suggests instead that the district court could not issue the telephonic interception authorization in part because the call originated (and was recorded) in Skamania County but was made to Clark County. Bliss does not dispute the fact that the alleged crimes occurred in Skamania County. Therefore, *Davidson* is distinguishable and does not control the outcome here.

Second, Bliss argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the alleged crimes are felonies. Bliss urges this court to so hold in part because although RCW 3.66.060 provides that district courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, there is no felony counterpart in that statute or elsewhere. The State, however, correctly recognizes that besides their jurisdiction to hear misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed in their respective counties, district courts also have jurisdiction to sit as committing magistrates and to conduct preliminary hearings in cases provided by law.[4] RCW 3.66.060(2).

Bliss does not address the fact that RCW 3.66.060 identifies several other circumstances over which the legislature has conferred jurisdiction to the district courts, including "preliminary hearings in cases provided by law." RCW 3.66.060 evinces a clear legislative intent to avoid

[4] *See also* RCW 3.66.010(1), which provides,

> The justices of the peace elected in accordance with chapters 3.30 through 3.74 RCW are authorized to hold court as judges of the district court for the trial of all actions enumerated in chapters 3.30 through 3.74 RCW or *assigned to the district court by law*; to hear, try, and determine the same according to the law.

restricting district court's criminal jurisdiction solely to misdemeanors. The legislature has plainly contemplated that sometimes district courts have the jurisdiction to issue rulings or process in felony cases that such courts are powerless to try.

RCW 3.66.060 does not define what constitutes a "preliminary hearing," but other decisions from our courts in analogous circumstances are instructive here. Our courts have recognized that district courts have the power to issue criminal process even in felony cases. In *State v. Stock*, 44 Wn. App. 467, 474, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986), Division One of this court rejected the argument that the district court's power to issue search warrants in felony cases "trenches upon, or takes away from the jurisdiction of the superior court" in violation of the state constitution.

In doing so, the *Stock* court cited the language in RCW 3.66.060 that provides that district courts have the jurisdiction to sit as committing magistrates and conduct preliminary hearings in cases provided by law and concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court of proceedings to keep the peace in their respective counties. 44 Wn. App. at 474. The court concluded that both district courts and superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue warrants. *Stock*, 44 Wn. App. at 474; *see also Werner*, 129 Wn.2d at 494 (stating that district courts and superior courts have statutory authority to issue arrest warrants for felons even though the district courts lack the jurisdiction to try such felons).

As examined above, reading the district court's criminal jurisdiction statutes with the Privacy Act further undermines Bliss's argument that the district court's authority to issue recording authorizations is negated by its lack of jurisdiction over felony matters. If Bliss's

interpretation of the statutes were correct, the legislature's use of the term "magistrate" would be rendered meaningless because the legislature has delegated to *judges and magistrates*—which includes district court judges—the authority to issue authorizations under RCW 9.73.090(2) upon a showing of probable cause that only a *felony* has been committed. And "'[s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.'" *State v. J.P.*, 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Davis v. Dep't of Licensing*, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)).

Although Bliss is correct that only the legislature may prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of the courts of limited jurisdiction, Bliss fails to address how the grant of authority to judges and magistrates in RCW 9.73.090(2) is not such a prescription. By enacting RCW 9.73.090(2), the legislature intended to delegate to district courts the authority to issue interception and recording authorizations pursuant to the Privacy Act under its jurisdiction to conduct preliminary hearings. The legislature thereby conferred on district courts the statutory authority to issue recording authorizations even though district courts lack the jurisdiction to try such cases.

We hold that the superior court erred as a matter of law by granting Bliss's motion to suppress on the ground that the district court lacked the authority or jurisdiction to issue the

recording authorization. Therefore, we reverse the superior court and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOHANSON, C.J.

We concur:

MAXA, J.

MELNICK, J.

LISA E TABBUT LAW OFFICE

February 16, 2016 - 7:54 AM

Transmittal Letter

Document Uploaded: 1-460840-Petition for Review.pdf

Case Name: State v. David E. Bliss
Court of Appeals Case Number: 46084-0

Is this a Personal Restraint Petition? Yes ■ No

The document being Filed is:

Designation of Clerk's Papers Supplemental Designation of Clerk's Papers

Statement of Arrangements

Motion: ____

Answer/Reply to Motion: ____

Brief: ____

Statement of Additional Authorities

Cost Bill

Objection to Cost Bill

Affidavit

Letter

Copy of Verbatim Report of Proceedings - No. of Volumes: ____
Hearing Date(s): _____

Personal Restraint Petition (PRP)

Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Reply to Response to Personal Restraint Petition

■ Petition for Review (PRV)

Other: _____

Comments:

Petition fro Review No. 92663-8

Sender Name: Lisa E Tabbut - Email: ltabbutlaw@gmail.com

A copy of this document has been emailed to the following addresses:

kick@co.skamania.wa.us